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SAILING AROUND ERIE: THE EMERGENCE OF A FEDERAL GENERAL
COMMON LAW OF ARBITRATION
By Kenneth F. Dunham1A
Introduction:
Some legal scholars opine that the current law on arbitration agreements is a natural
evolution of American contract law, while others are of the opinion that binding
contractual arbitration is a violation of existing federal law.1 The positions taken by the
academy and the legal community on arbitration have developed from the same factual
events, case law and statutes. How could so many people examine the same material and
defend positions which are polar opposites? Paradise for some, yet purgatory for others,
the binding pre-dispute arbitration clause evokes a night and day reaction depending upon
who is polled.
Few legal scholars would argue that arbitration law in the United States today is
totally different from arbitration law in the United States prior to 1925.2 From colonial
times until the passage of the United States Arbitration Act (USAA) in 1925, binding predispute arbitration agreements were considered unenforceable in most U.S. courts.3 The
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Associate Professor of Law, ADR Director, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Faulkner University.
For example, the work of two legal scholars yields opposite results. Professor Stephen Ware makes the
evolution of law argument in his book Alternative Dispute Resolution West, 2001. He has also voiced his
support of binding contractual arbitration in numerous law review and journal articles. Professor Jean
Sternlight has written numerous articles criticizing the effects of binding contractual arbitration, especially
in consumer cases. In “Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial,” a paper presented at the Roscoe
Pound Institute, Professor Sternlight argues that arbitration is becoming a substitute for jury trials and
interferes with access to justice by depriving claimants of their Seventh Amendment rights.
2
Both of the above listed professors in their works and numerous other legal scholars in their contributions
to the field agree that the American arbitration landscape in 1924 bears little resemblance to today’s
broadened picture of enforcement of nearly every kind of arbitration agreement.
3
Prior to the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925, the vast majority of states followed
the old common law arbitration doctrine of revocability. For a more thorough discussion of the state of
American arbitration law prior to 1925, see Professor Ian MacNeil’s book American Arbitration Law,
Oxford University Press 1992. Professor MacNeil describes the American arbitration scene prior to 1925
in great detail.
1
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chief argument of the opponents of binding contractual arbitration is that Congress never
intended the USAA to be more than a federal procedural act applicable only in the federal
court system. The supporters of binding contractual arbitration argue that Congress
actually intended the USAA to be substantive law applicable in all courts. Therefore,
one’s view of history is critical when developing a position statement on this issue.
The USAA became codified as Title 9 U.S.C.A. 1 et. seq. in 1947, as the Federal
Arbitration Act. The federal cases in which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is
scrutinized may be placed into two general categories. Category one includes cases prior
to 1984, in which the federal courts consistently held that the FAA was a federal
procedural act with judicial preference for its use. Category two includes cases decided
after 1984, in which the federal courts consistently held that the FAA is substantive law
and therefore preempts contrary state law.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court in Southland v. Keating4 held that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was applicable in all courts as substantive law. Prior to
Southland the FAA was generally understood to be a federal procedural act applicable
only in the federal courts.5 Justice O’Connor opined that the U.S. Supreme Court

4

Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). This case held that the FAA should no longer be considered a
procedural act applicable only in federal courts, but was substantive law applicable in all courts. Justice
Burger opined in Southland, “In enacting section 2 of the federal act (FAA), Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration…. The Federal
Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause….
Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in
mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.” Justice
O’Connor dissented and argued that the FAA was a procedural act applicable only in federal courts.
Justice Rehniqint joined with Justice O’Connor in the dissent which stated in part, “In 1925 Congress
emphatically believed arbitration to be a matter of ‘procedure’…. Today’s decision is unfaithful to
congressional intent, unnecessary, and in light of the FAA’s antecedents and the intervening contraction of
federal power, inexplicable.” The intervening contraction of federal power likely referred to the court’s
presumed power to decide general law before Erie. Southland became the seminal case on federal
preemption of state law by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.
5
Id. See Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Southland
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reinterpreted an existing procedural act to create substantive law.6 Southland’s critics
have charged that it has led to a body of federal general common law of arbitration which
is theoretically prohibited by the holding in Erie v. Thompkins.7
The view by proponents of binding contractual arbitration is that Southland was not
a one hundred, eighty degree turn from the high court’s prior opinions on the effect of the
FAA. Southland was the first case which clearly set forth the position the United States
Supreme Court had endeavored to take in earlier cases.8 Southland, according to its
supporters, was not an end run around the Erie principle, but a result of the Erie
principle’s application to existing federal law.9
A lot of paper and words have been used to defend these two positions. This article
postulates that reinterpretation of statutes from the bench is a not so rare occurrence in
any court especially in federal courts. The United States Constitution in Article III,
section 2 grants the United States Supreme Court and inferior federal courts the power to
interpret federal statutes. The federal courts regularly interpret the intent of congress in
federal statutes, even though the statutes subject to judicial interpretation may have been
in place for decades. Obviously, the 1984 Southland interpretation of the intent of
6

Id.
Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Brandeis pronouncements in Erie have remained
good law for over 67 years. The case came before the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether
a federal court in ruling on a matter of general jurisprudence should apply state law or exercise independent
judgment? The principle holding in Erie was that in federal courts except when a matter is governed by the
U.S. Constitution or a federal statute, the law to be applied is the law of the state. The rationale behind the
holding was that federal courts lacked the power to declare substantive rules through case law. Hence, the
conclusion reached in Erie was that federal general common law does not exist.
8
In earlier cases the United States Supreme Court wrestled with the relationship between state law and the
FAA, but never concluded that the FAA was substantive law. The Supreme Courts struggle with the
federalism suggested by Erie is illustrated in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc. 350 U.S. 198
(1956). The Supreme Court in Bernhardt made references to the federal law of arbitration, but declined to
rule that the FAA preempted state law. For a more in depth discussion of the reasoning of the court in
Bernhardt, see Professor Murray, Rau and Sherman’s book Arbitration, Foundation Press 1996, pp. 55-56.
9
The supporters of arbitration have argued that Erie actually helped the U.S. Supreme Court to move
toward the holding in Southland. See Professor Stephen Ware’s book Alternative Dispute Resolution, West
2001, pp. 28-30.
7
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Congress in 1925, when it passed the USAA/FAA, was not based on a consultation with
the deceased original sponsors of the legislation, but rather on a careful examination of
statutory language. Some of Southland’s dissenters argue that the real harm in Southland
lies in the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court changed existing law from the bench. Some
of these dissenters were on the Southland court and voiced their opposition in
Southland.10
The following pages contain a brief discussion of the history of arbitration in the
United States, followed by a history of the FAA, and a discussion of the intent behind the
original USAA in 1925. This article postulates that the United States Supreme Court
opinions prior to Southland in favor of arbitration, allowed the Supreme Court majority in
Southland to avoid the limitations of the Erie principle against creating a body of federal
general common law through interpretation and clarification of the intent of Congress.
Although prior federal court decisions did not hold that federal procedural law was
substantive law applicable in state courts, the language in several older Supreme Court
opinions indicates the high court has been troubled for many years by such issues as state
court forum shopping.11 An analysis of the reach of Southland through its progeny sets
the stage for the sections which follow on the direction the Southland decision is taking
American arbitration. The article contends that Southland was not a surprise holding, but
a holding consistent with a pattern of movement by federal courts away from federal
procedure status toward substantive law status for the FAA.
10

Supra Note 4.
Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This case held that federal courts cannot “create”
substantive rights denied by state courts in diversity cases, and cannot deny substantive rights created by
state law in accordance with Erie. The outcome in federal court or in state court should be the same under
Erie, Federal courts cannot allow plaintiffs to forum shop between courts depending upon the outcome they
desire. In diversity cases the same outcome must be available in state courts and federal courts, and this is
accomplished by following the state statutes.
11
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I.

Addressing the Erie Problem:
There is a handlebar shaped pile of rocks at the entrance to the Marina Del Rey

yacht basin not shown on most Los Angeles city maps. At the ocean end of the Marina
Del Rey channel a massive collection of boulders serves as a breakwater jetty.
Yachtsmen sailing into or out of Marina Del Rey must sail around this barrier to
navigation in order to arrive at their destination. The skilled sailor does not sail into the
rocks, but tacks to change direction thereby avoiding the rocks. Established legal
principles are sometimes like those rocks because longstanding rock solid legal principles
sometimes act as barriers to progress. When progress is needed those outdated principles
can be sailed around by skilled members of the judiciary employing analysis tools to
interpret old statutes in a new light. This is not an unfair or even unusual method of
gaining access to the desired destination.
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court in Erie v. Thompkins held that “Except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state.”12 Erie was intended to act as a complete barrier to
federal courts sailing straight ahead in diversity cases to legislate from the bench and
make new law. Erie allegedly forced those courts to follow state law.13 Prior to Erie,
federal courts were free to chart their own course in diversity cases, even if that course
ignored the public policies of the states. Post Erie, federal courts, at least theoretically,
could no longer craft decisions that ignored state law principles in diversity cases to
create a body of federal general common law in a subject area.14

12

Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Supra Note 7.
Id.
14
Id.
13
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Erie’s purpose was to force federal courts to consistently apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law in diversity removal cases.15 However, the Erie principle
has never been an ironclad doctrine applicable in all cases at all times.16 The survival of
removal actions in federal courts usually depends upon state law principles,17 but federal
common law controls the interpretation of federal statutory intent.18 Erie was never
intended to bar federal courts in diversity cases from interpreting existing federal statutes.
It’s purpose was to stop federal courts from creating new federal law that ignored existing
state law principles when the case was based upon state law. A general state choice-oflaw clause within an arbitration agreement does not force FAA mandates to yield to state
law, because agreements to arbitrate are controlled by a federal statute not state law.19
Therefore, even under the Erie principle, state law cannot bar binding arbitration under
the FAA.20 Subsequent to Southland, opinions interpreting the FAA have resulted in a
body of federal substantive law regarding arbitrability.21 This body of federal law
preempts state law even if the contract containing the arbitration clause purports to be
governed by state law. Thus, for all practical purposes, state law has been ousted from
the arbitration arena. It is necessary to understand the history of binding arbitration
agreements in the United States and additionally understand the history of the FAA in
order to understand the current state of arbitration law in the United States.
15

Gosperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive and federal procedural law.
16
Hill v. Martinez, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1115, (Colorado 2000) State law controls in federal diversity cases
unless it is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.
17
Caine v. Hardy 943 F.2d 1406, Cert. Denied 503 U.S. 936 (Miss 1991). Survival of some federal actions
depend upon the state laws of the state in which the federal court sits.
18
U.S. v. NEC Corp. 11 F. 3d 136 (Fla. 1993).
19
Sovak v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 280 F.3d 1266, rehearing denied 289 F3d 615 (Cal. 2002).
20
Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F2d 932 (Cal. 1992). State adhesion laws cannot nullify an
agreement to arbitrate under the FAA.
21
Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe’s Electronic Inc. 828 F. Supp. 178 (NY 1993). Although state law
applies to contracts to arbitrate to determine if the parties agreed to arbitrate, there is a body of federal
substantive law created by the FAA governing arbitrability of disputes.
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II.

The History of Predispute Binding Arbitration in the United States:
The idea of a general common law developed early in the recorded history of

England.22 It was brought to the colonies by the English, and this common law was
incorporated into the body of United States law.23 Common law probably originated
from the solidification of customs into case law.24 English monarchs were not concerned
with the needs and interests of commoners, so the common law served as a safety net for
public freedom.25 Under King Henry II, court decisions were written down and filed
under various categories for future reference.26 A filing system allowed future judges to
review prior decisions in the same category of law, and the case collection developed into
binding precedents, or stare decisis. English courts rarely reconsidered issues of a similar
nature.27 Once a recognized case set forth a principle to be followed, most judges
followed the stare decisis, even if they might personally wish to do otherwise.28
Common law and arbitration have a long and somewhat adversarial relationship.29
In fact, purpose of the FAA as set forth in Southland was to overcome judicial hostility to
arbitration as a process of resolving disputes. Until recent years, American courts
generally viewed arbitration with suspicion.30 Federal decisions ordering arbitration to
replace jury trials, when an underlying contract contains a predispute contractual
arbitration clause, have resulted in negative feelings about arbitration within the
22

Rial, Julie S., Origins of Common Law, International Encyclopedia of Justice Studies. Com, December
2002.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Glasser, Edward L., Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, p. 23. Yale Law School, Economics and
Organization Workshop, January, 2002.
26
Understanding Common Law, Sovereign Services, 1994, http://www.buildfreedom.com.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002). There has been a long standing hostility between courts
and arbitration.
30
Id.
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plaintiff’s bar.31 Some consumer groups have purchased billboards and personified
arbitration as an evil personage who robs average consumers of their due.32
Arbitration is not a thief. Arbitration is not a person. Arbitration is a conflict
resolution process used to resolve disputes that resembles a bench trial. There is not
much mystery in the process. Arbitration has been around for centuries and has been
used all over the world to resolve conflicts.33 In the 17th Century, English courts held
arbitration was a non-binding process.34 The English courts became concerned that
arbitration had the potential to displace or oust the court’s role in society.35 Through a
series of court decisions limiting the effect of arbitration, the English courts began to
view arbitration as a non-binding process based upon the principle of agency
revocability.36 The English reversed their position on binding arbitration in 1889, but
American courts continued down the old common law path.37 The common law doctrine
of revocability was followed by American courts until the enactment of the FAA in
1925.38 The doctrine of revocability was grounded in the public law courts fear that they

31

Id.
Alabama highway billboards sponsored by a “grass roots” consumer movement against arbitration
personify arbitration as a thief who steals rights. “Arbitration Steals Your Right To A Jury Trial.”
33
Riskin, Leonard L., Dispute Resolution and Lawyers, West (1997) p. 503 Nearly all-ancient civilizations
record the use of arbitration. Moses used arbitration during the Exodus. The Romans and Greeks used the
process in connection with their court systems. In the Middle Ages it was used in the European guild
system to resolve disputes. Arbitration was present in English common law and was brought to America
by the colonists. George Washington used arbitration to resolve Virginia land. In Vyniors, case 77 Eng.
Rep 595 (K.B. 1609), Lord Coke opined that the English court’s views of arbitration as revocable at will by
the parties who had contracted to use it. The rule set forth in Vyniors case was that the arbitrators were
agents of the parties, and the arbitrator’s agency could be revoked by the parties at any time until an
arbitration hearing had been held. This became known as the revocability doctrine. A second reason to
make arbitration revocable was the “ouster doctrine.” Courts were afraid that arbitration would oust them
from their jurisdiction over legal matters.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
The English Arbitration Act of 1889 made arbitration agreements irrevocable.
38
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). A Massachusetts court refused to
order specific performance of an arbitration agreement contained in a public works contract. The Tobey
court stated it was impractical to use equity to order arbitration and the plaintiff should exercise the legal
32
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might be displaced by a private process of dispute resolution and thereby be put out of
work.
The American judiciary’s view of arbitration prior to the FAA was that the parties’
pre-dispute contract to use arbitration, instead of the public courts, to resolve the dispute
would result in an improper removal or ouster of the court’s jurisdiction.39 Some state
statutes still follow the old common law view of arbitration. For example, Alabama’s
anti-pre-dispute arbitration statute, Ala. Code 8-1-41 (3), follows the common law view
of arbitration from the 18th and 19th centuries.40 After the passage of the FAA in 1925,
many states adopted modern arbitration statutes in order to align their state law with
current federal law on arbitration, but other states like Alabama hung on to its old laws.
From American Colonial times until 1925, several state statutes and the greater body of
American case law held binding pre-dispute contractual arbitration agreements to be
unenforceable and revocable at will by the parties who contracted for arbitration.41
III. The History Of The Federal Arbitration Act: New York Arbitration Act To
Southland And Beyond.
On April 19, 1920, the state of New York enacted the New York Arbitration Act,
code of Civil Procedure Sect. 2386, and today that act has been expanded into
Consolidated Laws of New York, CPLR Section 75.42 The New York statute made

remedies available. In Home Insurance Company of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874), the United
States Supreme Court held pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were invalid due to the common law
revocability of such agreements.
39
Stone, Katherine V.W., Arbitration Law 2-3 (Foundation Press 2003) and Private Justice, The Law of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Foundation Press (2003) 305. Vynoirs 77 Eng. Rep 595 (K.B. 1609).
40
Ala. Code 8-1-41(3).
41
The Birmingham News Company v. Sherry Horn, Ala. Supreme Court Case No. 1020553, June 11, 2004.
Under common law pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements were considered revocable at will
by the parties involved, if either desired to back out of the agreement prior to an arbitration hearing. The
FAA makes such agreements enforceable.
42
Consolidated Laws of New York, CPLR 75, is the latest version of the New York Arbitration Act.
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contractual arbitration agreements binding. The party seeking arbitration moved a state
court for an order to compel arbitration. The United States Supreme Court held that the
New York Arbitration Act could be used to enforce specific performance of a contract to
arbitrate, but it could not be used as a complete bar to litigation.43
Following, hearings, in which the procedural nature of the FAA was hashed and
re-hashed, the United States Congress failed to vote on the first version of a federal
arbitration statute in 1922, but the proposed statute was withdrawn and amended by its
supporters and the American Bar Association and brought back to Congress in 1924.44 It
was enacted as the United States Arbitration Act (USAA) on February 12, 1925.45 The
language of the USAA was principally patterned after the language of the New York
Arbitration Act, but the final version contained some significant changes from the New
York Act.46 The USAA was eventually codified as the United States Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), United States Code Title 9, on July 30, 1947. The hearings which were held
prior to the original enactment of the USAA in 1925, did not indicate that the act would

43

Kennedy, Donald J., Maritime Arbitration 1899-1999, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn LLP 2003. Although
the New York Arbitration Act held promise to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility regarding
arbitration, in its initial test in the court, Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. 109 (1924), held
that the New York statute was an available remedy to enforce a contract, but not a bar to litigation.
44
MacNeil, Ian R., American Arbitration Law, Oxford University Press, NY (1992), p. 42. Professor
MacNeil traces the history of arbitration in America through the 19th and 20th Centuries. He includes the
beginning of the movement to change arbitration law from holding arbitration agreements unenforceable to
holding them enforceable in federal courts. He traces the history of the FAA from the efforts of a few to
the push by the ABA to get the act through Congress. He discusses the impact of Southland v. Keating and
moves on to discuss international arbitration and the New York Convention. MacNeil criticizes
Southland’s court for ignoring the history of the FAA and transforming the act into a different kind of law
than the one envisioned by its drafters. Although MacNeil’s conclusions about the FAA have been
challenged by some scholars, his historical digest of the FAA’s early years is without equal.
45
Id. p. 47.
46
Id. p. 52.
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be binding on state courts.47 The FAA did not contain so much as a sentence fragment
granting federal jurisdiction in arbitration cases.48
According to Professor Ian MacNeil in his book American Arbitration,49 there were
a number of organizations across the United States that endeavored to promote binding
arbitration in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s. The American Bar Association got behind
these efforts and spear-headed the movement to get a national arbitration act to
Congress.50 However, due to some objections to the draft act, the ABA withdrew and
revised the first draft of the USAA and resubmitted it to congress. The revised draft was
eventually passed in virtually the same form as it exists today.51 The history of
arbitration law under the USAA, and prior to the USAA as a collection of states passing
arbitration statutes, is an interesting series of events containing numerous “ups” and
“downs” for the use of arbitration as an alternative to the public law courts.
Following its passage in 1925, the USAA was used in the federal courts, if a
binding predispute arbitration contract clause was present in a federal case.52 The federal
courts refused to order arbitration under the USAA if the matter was originally litigated
in a state court, before being removed to the federal court on diversity grounds. This was
due at least in part to the Erie doctrine’s state law application mandates. Following
Southland the references in the case law to Erie all but disappeared, and federal courts

47

Id. p. 117 & 118.
9 U.S.C.A. Sect. 1 et. seq.
49
Supra Note 44.
50
Id.
51
Id. Professor MacNeil’s descriptions of the early days of the arbitration effort are quite colorful.
52
Id.
48
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now routinely cite the FAA’s Section 2 language placing arbitration agreements in any
court upon the same footing as other contracts.53
There is no specific language in the FAA, 9 USCA Section 1 et. seq., that states
there is a federal policy in favor of arbitration which preempts contrary state law. The
federal policy favoring arbitration language came from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.
V. Mercury Construction Company 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and was confirmed and expounded
upon by the United States Supreme Court in Southland with its interpretation of the intent
of Congress dating back to when the USAA was drafted in 1925.54 Southland
harmonized the outcome of arbitration under the FAA with the outcome under state
law.55 The Erie doctrine was discussed in arbitration cases prior to Southland, such as
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America.56 However, the federal courts declined to

53

HIM Portland, LLC v. Devito Builders, 317 F.3d 41 (2003). Justice Torruella wrote “Congress enacted
the FAA to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts and to render them valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”
54
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Supra Note 1 “In enacting section 2 of the federal act (FAA),
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. . . .
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the
Commerce Clause. . . Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong
indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts.”
55
Id.
56
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Bernhardt entered into an
employment contract containing an arbitration clause in New York. Bernhardt later moved to Vermont,
and performed his duties under the employment contract in Vermont. Bernhardt was fired by Polygraphic
Company of America, Inc., while working in Vermont. He brought a lawsuit against Polygraphic in a
Vermont state court, and Polygraphic removed it to federal district court. The U.S. District Court denied
Polygraphic’s motion to compel arbitration due to the Erie doctrine requirement of following state law in
cases removed on diversity grounds. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court wrote the
majority opinion which remanded the case to the federal district court in Vermont to determine which state
law, Vermont or New York, applied to Bernhardt’s case. Justice Douglas opined that Erie R. Co. v.
Thompkins required the case to be decided by local law. The California Supreme Court in its holding in
Southland appeared to follow the Erie doctrine in its application of California law. Justice Douglas based
the court’s treatment of Bernhardt on principles set forth in Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, and stated
“If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of the litigation
might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought.”

13

disturb the perceived procedural status of the FAA until Southland.57 The early cases
acknowledged the problem of state versus federal court forum shopping but did nothing
to correct the problem because earlier cases viewed the FAA as procedural.58 Some have
been critical of the California state trial court’s analysis in Southland, but the California
Supreme Court’s ruling in Southland followed very closely the principles enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in 1956, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
Inc.59 Bernhardt viewed the FAA as a procedural statute.60 However, Bernhardt
confirmed the principle of eliminating forum shopping by stating the same result should
be obtained in state and federal courts as had been previously enunciated in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).61 The California trial court that heard the
Southland case likely thought it had followed the prevailing law in arbitration cases.
IV.

Locating the Original Intent Of Congress: Coupling The FAA and The

Commerce Clause And Attaching Both To The Supremacy Clause:
At the time Southland was decided, some states had statutes making the
enforcement of arbitration agreements illegal as against public policy.62 Following
Southland, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the Commerce
Clause, as it applies to FAA sanctioned arbitrations, must be interpreted broadly so as to
apply to state court actions affecting interstate commerce.63 The United States Supreme
Court has also made it clear that the FAA is preemptive of any contrary state statute
57

Southland, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). See Note 4.
Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Bernhardt concluded
that the FAA was tied to U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2 and “does not obviously apply to diversity
cases.” Supra Note 47.
59
Id. at 204
60
Id. at 203
61
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See Note 11.
62
25. Alabama, Mississippi, and West Virginia. See Stephen J. Ware, Alternative Dispute Resolution.
(West Group 2001).
63
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S. Ct. 2037 (2003).
58
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under the Supremacy Clause, because the FAA clearly expresses the intent of Congress to
enforce arbitration agreements to the full reach of the Commerce Clause.64
For nearly sixty years the United States Supreme Court, in apparent compliance
with Erie, held that state law should be applied to arbitration agreements in state courts.65
Erie was pure federalism. The Southland opinion was seen as inconsistent with
federalism, although it was rendered by a court supportive of federalism principles.66
The dissent in Southland by Justice O’Connor and Justice Rehnquist is indicative of a
federalist’s response to Southland.
Professor Stephen Ware opines that the federal courts were able to separate the
procedural from the substantive when applying the Erie doctrine.67 The Supreme Court
then took a serious look at upholding arbitration clauses through a series of cases.68 The
federal courts used their own rules and procedures, if a case was removed from a state
court to a federal court, but avoided using their decisions to create federal substantive law
applicable in state court cases.69 The Supreme Court was aware that if various state
arbitration laws were applied in removal cases it could encourage forum shopping.70
Southland address the forum shopping problem head on by preempting state law.
The United States Supreme Court in Southland used statutory intent to couple the
FAA to the Commerce Clause and enforce arbitration with a Supremacy Clause

64

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
Schwartz, David S., Mandatory Arbitration: Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory
Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5
(Winter/Spring 2004). Professor Schwartz addresses the impact of Southland on Erie. He concludes that
Southland was not a good decision when it was made, but the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
overrule its own precedent in Southland.
66
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argument.71 When Southland interpreted the Article III procedural act FAA as a
substantive law act FAA, it extended the reach of the FAA into state courts.72 State law
could never be preempted by a federal procedural law, but state law will always be
preempted by a federal substantive law.
V.

The Cases Preceding SouthlandThat Set The Stage For Southland:
The first significant departure from ordinary contract law governing contractual

arbitrations came in the 1967 case of Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.73 Prima Paint required federal courts to give special consideration to predispute
arbitration clauses in regular contracts.74 The requirement of a special examination of
arbitration clauses became known as the separability doctrine.75 It required federal courts
to separate the arbitration clause from its so-called container contract for examination.76
This case was the beginning of elevated status in federal courts for contractual predispute
arbitration clauses, because Prima Paint gave predispute arbitration agreements a unique
status in contract law.77 Arbitration clauses were to be carved out and examined on their
own merits.78 Prima Paint required courts to determine if the arbitration clause itself was
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under attack or if the contract as a whole was being challenged. If the contract as a whole
that was alleged to be void ab initio, then the case would be sent to arbitration where the
arbitrator(s) would decide the issues.79 If the arbitration clause itself was challenged,
then courts would decide if the parties had agreed to arbitrate, and if arbitration was
appropriate.80 This “special” analysis went well beyond placing arbitration clauses on
the same footing as other contracts.81
Federal courts allow immediate review of orders denying arbitration, but disallow
immediate appellate review of orders granting arbitration.82 The federal courts therefore
treat arbitration agreements differently from other contracts.83 Courts that review
arbitration awards do not review the awards based upon general contract principles, but
the standards of review are limited to those set forth in the FAA.84 These modern review
standards originated in Prima Paint.
The second major step on the path to Southland came in the 1983 United States
Supreme Court case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Company.85 In Moses H. Cone, the court declared a “liberal federal policy” favoring
79
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arbitration. Moses H. Cone held that the FAA section 2 created a body of “federal
substantive law of arbitration.”86 Although the Moses H. Cone case involved a
controversy over the issuance of a stay in a federal lawsuit until the state law claims had
been resolved, its language regarding arbitration would resurface in Southland explaining
the federal policy in favor of arbitration.87 Moses H. Cone also paved the way for the
holding in Southland because it enunciated a federal policy in favor of arbitration by
using a Commerce Clause argument.88 The special contract analysis required under
Prima Paint and the favoritism enunciated in Moses H. Cone, in some ways “telegraphed
the punch” of the Supreme Court in Southland.
VI. The Academy Speaks Out On Southland: What Others Have Said:
The shift in the high court’s preference for arbitration did not go unnoticed by legal
scholars.89 Some scholars, like Professor Jean Sternlight have questioned the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Southland,90 while others like Professor Richard Reuben have
explored the impact of this shift on the way state courts treat contractual arbitration
clauses.91 Professor Stephen Ware and others have defended Southland and the United

the Fourth Circuit reversed the federal district court and remanded the case for arbitration. The United
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States Supreme Court’s current position on arbitration.92 One of the leading critic’s of
Southland has been Professor Ian MacNeil, whose book American Arbitration provides
an in-depth analysis of the legislative history of the FAA.93 Professor Christopher
Drahozal, who supports the Southland outcome, even thought the court’s reasoning may
have been flawed has written articles in defense of Southland.94 In Professor Drahozal’s
view, the majority in Southland may have used weak analysis, but the correct conclusion
was reached.95
Legal scholars appear to locate themselves within or near two distinct camps
regarding the Southland opinion: Southland is good law or Southland is bad law.
Obviously, some scholars like Professor Ware believe Southland was a well-reasoned
decision supported by the historical facts, while others like Professor Sternlight believe
Southland was a poorly reasoned decision that was not based on law or fact. There are
other scholars like Professor Drahozal who view Southland as good law regardless of the
path the court took to arrive at its holding. Still other scholars like Professor Reuben
question the long-term impact of Southland on other areas of the law like individual
rights. There is no general consensus among legal scholars on the rationale or effect of
Southland. The academy seems as divided on Southland as the court who rendered the
opinion.
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VII. The Primary Effect Of Southland On The Legal System: Preemption of State
Anti-Arbitration Laws.
The federal courts rely on the Supremacy Clause to preempt state anti-arbitration
laws and uphold the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to enforce the
mandates of the FAA.96 In Southland, the Supreme Court held that Congress in 1925 had
intended that the FAA be a substantive law act enforcing the Commerce Clause in all
courts, and had never intended the FAA to be limited to Article III procedural matters.97
The Southland court resolved the continuing conflict between state and federal arbitration
law by using the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause as applied to the FAA to
nullify the effect of state anti-arbitration laws.98
Although the Southland argument under Commerce Clause was persuasive for a
majority of the court, the dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor in Southland pointed out the fact that the FAA’s history was purely
procedural.99 Justices Rehnquist’s and O’Connor’s review of congressional hearings
preceding the FAA concludes that Congress never intended for the FAA to become a
substantive law act.100 For all practical purposes, there is a presumption argument on
both sides of the issue. The members of Congress who held these hearings prior to the
FAA’s passage can no longer be called upon to explain their intent in passing the FAA,
because they died years ago, and their true intent for the FAA died with them. The
dissenting opinions in Southland seem to suggest Southland’s true purpose was to
96
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establish a stare decisis favoring the use of arbitration agreements in contracts
nationwide, rather than offering an interpretation of Congress’ true intent behind the
FAA.101 Perhaps the majority’s interpretation of Congressional intent in Southland
stretches the interpretative envelope, but it also accomplishes the goal of a harmonized
approach to arbitration in all American courts. One of the major effects of Southland on
the legal system has been to eliminate state court forum shopping in arbitration cases and
harmonizing the legal system on a divisive issue.
In Perry v. Thomas, Justice Stevens dissent re-visited the Southland opinion when
he wrote, “Even though the Arbitration Act (FAA) had been on the books for almost 50
years, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even considered the possibility that
the Act had pre-empted state created rights. It is only in the last few years that the Court
has effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that congress certainly
did not intend.”102 Justice Stevens viewed Southland as a rewriting of the FAA to make
the statute substantive law so as to preempt state arbitration law.103 The Southland
opinion thus created uniformity in the treatment of arbitration clauses, no matter which
type of court was presented with a motion to compel arbitration.104
Southland led to cheers from the business community and to jeers from the
plaintiff’s bar and consumer advocacy groups. One Alabama plaintiff’s law firm,
Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles PC, publishes a monthly newsletter
containing a traffic symbol circle with a line drawn through it on the subject of
101
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arbitration. Apparently, the message is “arbitration – no.” The long-term effects of
Southland on Constitutional issues such as access to justice and the waiver of the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial are still in the refinement stage. There is no question that
Southland has resulted in residual effects reaching across several areas of the law. The
clarification of these effects will take time to fully develop.
VIII. The Southland Progeny: State Arbitration Laws Die Hard
The next major state law preemption case following Southland was Allied Bruce
Terminex v. Dobson.105 Ala. Code 8-1-41(3), declared pre-dispute arbitration clauses
could not be specifically enforced in Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama in
Terminex interpreted Southland to hold that Congress’ power to enforce the Commerce
Clause under the FAA was limited to situations where the parties contemplated that
interstate commerce would be substantially affected by their transaction.106 After
weighing the facts in the Terminex case, the Supreme Court of Alabama determined that
the parties did not contemplate that interstate commerce would be substantially affected
by a termite bond issued on Dobson’s residence, and that Alabama’s anti-arbitration
statute, Ala. Code 8-1-41(3), applied.107 The denial of the motion to compel arbitration
was appealed by Terminex. On appeal the United States Supreme Court found the
Supreme Court of Alabama’s reasoning was based on too narrow an interpretation of
“affecting commerce,” and held that the words “affecting commerce” should receive a
very broad interpretation. The United States Supreme Court held that the contemplation
of the parties regarding commerce did not matter, but the actual transactions effect on

105

Allied Bruce Terminex Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995)
Dobson v. Allied Bruce Terminex Co., 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993)
107
Id. at 357
106

22

commerce should determine whether the FAA applied.108 In Terminex the United States
Supreme Court held that pest control chemicals shipped across state lines to treat
Dobson’s house met the definition of interstate commerce.109
In addition to the Section 2 language from the FAA, the language from Southland
was generously used in Terminex. Justice Breyer stated in Terminex that “nothing
significant has changed in the ten years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have
eroded Southland’s authority. . . .”110 It is interesting that Justice Breyer referred to
Southland’s authority rather that the authority of the FAA. Justice O’Connor wrote in her
concurrence, “Today’s decision caps this court’s effort to expand the Federal Arbitration
Act. Although each decision has built logically upon the decisions preceding it, the
initial building block in Southland laid a faulty foundation.”111 Although Terminex may
have presented the court with a significant opportunity to limit or even overturn
Southland, due to the head-on collision between the FAA and Ala. Code 8-1-41(3)
occurring in a state court, the United States Supreme Court stood by Southland and
strengthened the federal policy favoring arbitration in Terminex.112
There were at least two schools of thought regarding the impact of Terminex on
state anti-arbitration laws: the line of reasoning followed by the United States Supreme
Court, and the line of reasoning followed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. The
Terminex opinion by the United States Supreme Court did not deter the Alabama
Supreme Court from attempting to find some other way to uphold Alabama’s public
policy on predispute arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court of Alabama reasoned
108
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that Ala. Code 8-1-41(3) had not declared unconstitutional byTerminex , but the
application of the FAA to the facts in Terminex resulted in a transaction that substantially
affected interstate commerce.113 This interpretation led the Supreme Court of Alabama to
devise a five-prong test to determine if commerce had been affected, and the test created
a line of state-commerce-only cases governed by Alabama’s anti-arbitration statute, and a
parallel line of cases held to be substantially affecting interstate commerce governed by
the FAA.114
Part of the Alabama court’s reasoning may have been a misunderstanding of the
intent of the Terminex decision, but the public policy of Alabama as expressed in Ala.
Code 8-1-41(3) probably played a major role in the establishment of the two streams of
cases. Unlike federal judges who are appointed, Alabama’s Supreme Court justices are
elected. State Supreme Court justices answer in the ballot box to the citizens’ assessment
of their performance in upholding Alabama’s laws.115 They have a moral and ethical
duty to follow the wishes of their constituency, but they also have a duty to follow the
rule of law in their decisions. The Alabama Supreme Court endeavored to do both things
with a new line of reasoning.
The Supreme Court of Alabama explained their new line of reasoning in Sisters of
the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company,116 an Alabama case which utilized the
Commerce Clause limitation language contained in United States v. Lopez.117 The United
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States Supreme Court had held in Lopez that Congress’ power to enforce the Commerce
Clause was not unlimited. Lopez was a school zone gun case that had nothing to do with
arbitration, but everything to do with limiting the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Alabama used the holding in Lopez to
construct a five-prong test to determine if the underlying transaction leading to the
contract containing the predispute arbitration clause substantially affected interstate
commerce, thereby activating the FAA mandate to arbitrate.118 If the facts of each case
met all five-prongs of the Sisters substantial interstate commerce contracts test it was said
to fall under the mandate of the FAA to arbitrate, but if the facts met only one or two of
the prongs of the Sisters test it was governed by Ala. Code 8-1-41(3), because the power
of Congress to control commerce was not unlimited.119
The second school of thought regarding the effect of Terminex on Ala. Code 8-141(3) was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco.120 Alafabco held that the words “involving commerce” should be given the
broadest possible reading. The interpretation of “involving commerce” set forth in
Alafabco is the equivalent of “affecting commerce,” and this definition does not allow the
states much “wiggle room” in drafting anti-arbitration statutes.121 It is clear from
Alafabco that the federal courts will enforce almost any arbitration clause under the
FAA’s mandate to arbitrate, and any contrary state law will be preempted.122 In fact,
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Alafabco held that Congress’ Commerce Clause power “may be exercised in individual
cases without showing any specific effect on interstate commerce.”123
Alabama has been in the forefront of the Southland controversy, but other states
have also failed to accept the FAA mandates until a few struggles occurred highlighting
the tension between state public policy and the FAA. Some states have attempted to limit
or eliminate arbitration altogether, if certain conditions are not met. A Montana statute,
for example, required any contract containing an arbitration clause to post a notice of the
arbitration clause in bold letters on the front page of the contract to protect the unwary.
However, the United States Supreme Court in Doctors Associates v. Casarotto held the
statute’s notice requirement was unconstitutional, because it placed arbitration on a
different footing from other contracts.124 A New York statute disallowed punitive
damages in arbitration based upon a public policy against punitive damages in contract
cases. A contract containing an arbitration clause also contained choice of law language
selecting New York law to govern the contract in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.125 The arbitrators returned an award containing punitive damages contrary to
New York law. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court upheld the arbitrator’s
award of punitive damages based upon the contract itself not excluding punitive
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damages.126 Thus, parties to an arbitration agreement may contract for potential
arbitration awards that are contrary to state law.127
The federal courts generally enforce state laws that support arbitration, even if those
laws are not worded exactly like the FAA.128 The federal courts have made it clear that
state laws eliminating arbitration will be preempted by the FAA, and only generally
recognized state law contract defenses will be allowed to overcome the federal
presumption in favor of arbitration.129 The federal presumption is that arbitration clauses
should be enforced, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration.130 District
courts should not only stay litigation until the arbitration is completed, but also should
stay litigation in the event a denied motion to compel arbitration has been appealed.131
The federal judiciary has made its point vividly clear with regard to state laws limiting or
eliminating contractual binding arbitration. Any state law which allows state courts to
by-pass the mandates of the FAA will be pre-empted. There are no exceptions.
IX. The Preemption of Federal Law by the FAA: Waiver Of The Seventh
Amendment Right To a Jury Trial In Arbitration.
At the time Southland was decided it was understood that in order to waive the
constitutional right to a jury trial a person had to knowingly and intelligently waive that
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right by signing an agreement containing a waiver. This was not a major problem prior
to Southland, but it became a sticky issue in some of Southland’s progeny. Does a
waiver require signatures to be held valid? What standards of assent will be applied?
The so-called “shrink wrap” cases allowed the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses even when the parties had not signed an arbitration agreement. In Hill v.
Gateway a federal court held consumers were required to arbitrate their claim against a
computer manufacturer because the computer-shipping box held not only a computer, but
also a package of shrink-wrapped documents notifying the consumers of an arbitration
requirement.132 Thus, under a contractual assent standard, assent to use arbitration as an
alternative forum to courts can be found by action or non-action. Not all federal courts
follow the contractual assent rule. Some federal courts have held that consumers may not
be held to a waiver of their rights by contractual assent, but actual notice and written
waiver are required evidenced by a signature.133 The United States Supreme Court has
not dealt with this waiver issue so as to clear up the divergent paths taken by federal
courts in this area of constitutional law.
A non-signatory party may also be held to assent to waiver by endeavoring to use
the contract containing the arbitration clause to their advantage. Beneficiaries seeking to
enforce a contract, although they never signed the contract, have also been held to the
terms of an arbitration clause, because they seek to enforce the contract terms against a
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signatory to the contract.134 If they seek enforcement of the terms they have accepted the
terms. Plaintiff Dobson in Terminex was a third-party beneficiary to the termite bond
containing the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the Supreme Court seems willing to
accept contractual assent by Third Parties.
X.

The Pandora’s Box of Southland’s Progeny: Class Actions And Punitive
Damages
Southland opened the door to creative thinking by some members of the plaintiff’s

bar. Courts have been divided for years over the appropriateness of class actions in
arbitration. Some courts have ruled out class actions in arbitration, while other courts
have left the class action determination to the arbitrators.135 The United States Supreme
Court in one of Southland’s progeny opened the door to class actions in arbitration by
holding that arbitrators, not courts, may determine whether a class action will be
allowed.136 Like the punitive damages issue presented in Mastroubuono, the holding in
Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle can be interpreted to take a permissive
approach if the contract language is silent on class actions.137 The holding in Bazzle is
notice to contract drafters that remedies not excluded in the contract language may be
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included.138 The current situation in arbitration has caused many contract drafters to reexamine their standard arbitration clauses and shore up traditional boiler plate
language.139 Some businesses may decide to refuse to arbitrate if class actions are
allowed, but the party refusing to arbitrate under a contractual agreement has the burden
to prove the contract is not subject to the enforcement provisions of the FAA.140 It is
anyone’s guess as to how the courts will treat future class action cases due to the farreaching implications of Bazzle, but the decision has certainly caused the business
community a great deal of concern.141 Arbitration clauses were presumed to have
protected business’ exposure to class actions, but following Bazzle there is substantial
doubt as to arbitrations’ ability to eliminate class actions.142
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businesses. Professor Ware contrasts criminal and civil waivers and concludes the contractual consent
waiver rather than the knowing consent waiver will likely prevail in future Supreme Court cases.
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XI. Taking Contractual Arbitration To Work After Southland: The All Powerful
Agreement To Arbitrate In Employment Cases
The supporters of arbitration under the FAA point out that constitutional rights and
statutory rights are not inalienable and can be waived by contract.143 An argument has
arisen over the type of consent needed for waiver in employment cases and the results are
mixed. Some of arbitration’s supporters want a contractual standard of consent, while
opponents want a knowing standard of consent.144 Contractual assent does not require an
employee to be given an explanation of arbitration, while knowing assent requires
evidence in writing of consent to arbitrate. It may well be that the federal presumption in
favor of arbitration has virtually eliminated knowing consensual waiver as a defense in
contractual arbitration cases where the employee is a party to the contract.145 Employees
are not generally held to contractual waiver in union contracts, because the employee
played no role in the formation of the contract.
Drafters of arbitration clauses may not receive a totally unencumbered path to
arbitration in statutory rights cases in the employment area. Although a contracting party
may have waived statutory rights by signing an arbitration agreement, a federal agency
may still have a cause of action on behalf of the aggrieved party that is not subject to
arbitration.146 For example, in EEOC v. Waffle House the court held that although an
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employee had waived statutory rights claims, the EEOC had not been estopped from
pursuing those claims under the federal statute.147 Employers who choose to insert
arbitration agreements into employment contracts can force the employee into arbitration
but may not be able to use the FAA to force a federal agency out of the public law
courts.148 Following Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. the green light was given
to employers to use arbitration agreements in employment contracts to force employees
to arbitrate all claims, including statutory claims.149 There exists a serious debate over
whether employees should be forced to sign a contract waiving their constitutionally
guaranteed rights in order to obtain employment.
XII. Defenses Against The FAA Mandate To Arbitrate Under State Contract Law:
And Defenses To Awards Rendered:
Defenses to arbitration agreements and avoidance of arbitration is dependent upon
state contract law defenses. All of the normal state law defenses to contracts are
available to a party seeking to avoid arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration
agreement is flawed. Mutual mistake is not often used as a defense to the arbitration
contract, although it is conceivable the party seeking to set aside the arbitration
agreement could prove the parties agreed to different terms when forming the agreement
to arbitrate.150 Detrimental reliance on terms that were fraudulently induced can serve as
grounds to rescind a contract.151 The fundamentals of this defense are that one party lied,
the lie was intentional and was told for purposes of inducing the other party to contract,
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the other party relied on the lie to enter the contract and damages resulted.152 Courts have
also sustained breach of contract claims against the drafters of contracts of adhesion
when the arbitration process contained in the contract lacked “the rudiments of evenhandedness.”153 Courts have held that contracts that are constructed as one-sided in favor
of the drafter are unconscionable and are subject to rescission.154 These cases are,
however, the exception to the reality of arbitration agreements. Once executed, there are
few sustainable defenses against an arbitration agreement. In the vast majority of cases,
agreements to arbitrate are upheld and enforced by the courts.
Georgia was the first state to recognize manifest disregard of the law by the
arbitrator(s) as a ground for vacatur of an arbitration award.155 While there is growing
interest in manifest disregard of the law as a vehicle for challenging arbitration awards,
the best definition of “manifest disregard of the law” is still in the developmental
stages.156 Another area of keen interest is the potential of award challenges based on
arbitrator bias. California has passed new ethical standards for arbitrators requiring
disclosure of past dealings between arbitrators and the parties.157 Although arbitrators
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and arbitration providers oppose these new standards of disclosure, the opponents of
arbitration hope to prove arbitration bias through the information obtained through these
standards.158 Arbitrator bias can also be a ground upon which to assert a contract defense
of unconscionability against the arbitration process.159 If the opponents of arbitration can
demonstrate financial ties to one of the parties by the arbitrators, they may have a ground
for setting aside any award rendered based on bias or challenging the process before the
hearing is held on grounds of unconscionability. Financial consequences of the
arbitration on the challenging party appears to be a more difficult defense, unless there is
proof on record of the financial inequities of the process on one of the parties.160
In addition to the state law contract defenses to the arbitration agreement, parties
also have defenses to the arbitration award. 9 USC Section 10 lists the following grounds
for vacating an arbitration award:
(1)

Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.

(2)

Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.

(3)

Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.

(4)

Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
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(5)

Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.

All but one of the grounds involves arbitrator misconduct. All are exceptionally difficult
to prove. 9 U.S.C. Section 11 also provides the following grounds for modifying or
correcting a flawed arbitration award:
(a)

Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred
to in the award.

(b)

Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted.

(c)

Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.

Conclusion
Prior to Southland, the chief problem for federal courts in diversity cases containing
arbitration clauses was that not all state arbitration laws were the same. For example,
New York promoted the use of predispute contractual arbitration, Alabama prohibited the
use of predispute contractual arbitration and California allowed predispute contractual
arbitration in some cases, while prohibiting it in others.161 Therefore, depending upon the
state law to be applied by the federal courts under the Erie principle to the facts of the
cases, the outcomes could be radically different. Such state-to-state variances could lead
to forum shopping in arbitration cases, which was troubling to the United States Supreme
Court.162 The cases prior to Southland offered little help in resolving the forum shopping
dilemma, because the FAA’s language did not grant federal jurisdiction in arbitration
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cases.163 The FAA had been written like a federal procedural act and it lacked the
trappings of a substantive law act. Although the dilemma was addressed in early federal
cases involving the FAA, there appeared to be little the courts could do about the
problem, due to the application of the Erie principle.164
Southland addressed the problem and resolved the dilemma by converting a
procedural FAA into a substantive law act by placing a new interpretation on the intent of
Congress regarding the FAA. The majority in Southland cited some of the testimony
from the Congressional hearings leading up to the FAA, and concluded that Congress had
intended the FAA to be substantive using a Commerce argument.165 The minority in
Southland also cited testimony from the Congressional hearings leading up to the FAA,
and their conclusion was that the FAA was never intended to be substantive. Southland’s
progeny share the theme of expansion of the FAA’s reach with their common ancestor.
Circuit City Stores v. Adams held that the Congressional intent behind the FAA was to
regulate commerce and preempt contrary state laws.166 Geir v. American Honda Motor
Co. held that state law must yield if it stands in the way of the accomplishment of the
purposes and objectives of Congress.167 Contractual arbitration agreements will be
enforced unless state law contract defenses apply.168 The point is that state contract law
cannot bring federal commerce to a halt by prohibiting the use of arbitration and insisting
upon litigation in every contracts case.
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The progeny contain language from both the FAA and Southland and usually a
dissent or two stating the FAA was never intended to apply to the state courts. Although
the United States Supreme Court has been provided with numerous opportunities to limit
or reverse its holding in Southland over the past twenty-one years, the high court has
declined to change its direction. Southland has successfully sailed around the rocks Erie,
but the question remains where is arbitration going now that Southland has clearedthe
jettys?
Opponents of arbitration continue to attack the fairness of the process and point out
access to justice problems created by the contractual waivers of rights contained in
arbitration clauses.169 Their argument is a repackaging of the old ouster doctrine under
the common law, preferring litigation over arbitration in all cases. The common law
view of predispute contractual arbitration as a revocable process, was dealt a death blow
by Southland. The question of whether Southland and its progeny have resulted from a
court legislating from the bench, or simply a reinterpretation of Congressional statutory
intent, becomes a moot question in light of current federal law. Southland does not
represent the first case to reinterpret the intent behind existing statutory law, and it is
unlikely that Southland will be the last such case. Current federal case law favors the
enforcement of binding predispute arbitration clauses, and there is no indication by the
courts or Congress that the rule of law in this area is likely to change anytime soon.
Arbitration’s opponents appear to be fighting a losing battle in their efforts to limit or
eliminate the FAA or reverse the holding in Southland. Perhaps their time would be
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better spent in finding creative ways to use the FAA to benefit their clients, like the
claimants in Green Tree v. Bazzle.170
Southland’s progeny are continuing to define the length and width of arbitration’s
reach under the FAA. No doubt, some members of the legal profession long for the days
of yesteryear when the law was more static in this area. However, the full effect of
Southland and its progeny has yet to be realized. The initial issues of binding agreements
to arbitrate and preemption of state antiarbitration laws have been resolved. The law in
this field has now moved on to address new issues like the availability of punitive
damages and class actions. It is likely to be some time before the law is settled in those
areas. Southland removed the lid from a Pandora’s box of possibilities for enforcement
of arbitration under the FAA because it created a federal common law with regard to
arbitration. The only organization that can replace that lid is the United States Congress,
and Congress has not given the slightest indication of any impending efforts to limit or
eliminate the FAA.
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